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Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on
The Equity Power of the Federal Courts?
By A. CHARLES DELL'iRIO*
On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court delivered its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.1 The Court concluded, in
what soon became famous language, that, "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 2 Twenty-one years later, legislatively mandated, overt segregation has ended. Yet throughout the
country, especially in the larger cities, black and white children attend
school primarily with members of their own race.3 The racial imbalance that still persists is not always the result of prior state imposed
segregation or invidious discrimination by school boards.4 The growing
number of one-race schools reflects the general demographic changes
that are occurring throughout major urban areas of both North and
South.
The Court which decided Brown I was cognizant that a bald declaration of a constitutional proscription against racially segregated schools
was only the beginning. When the case was set for reargument after
the 1954 Term, the Court propounded certain questions for consideration by the parties. Two of the five questions focused on the nature
and scope of an appropriate remedy should a constitutional violation
* B.A., 1969, Stanford University; J.D., 1974, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown 11.
2. Id. at 495.
3. "The percentage of Negro pupils which attended schools more than 80% black
was 91.3 in Cleveland, Ohio; 97.8 in Compton, California; 78.1 in-Dayton, Ohio; 78.6
in Detroit, Michigan; 95.7 in Gary, Indiana; 86.4 in Kansas City, Missouri; 86.6 in Los
Angeles, California; 78.8 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 91.3 in Newark, New Jersey; 89.9
in St. Louis, Missouri [in 1971]." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, at
218-19 n.4 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
4. Note, Segregation in the Metropolitan Context: The "White Noose" Tightens,
58 IowA L. REv. 322, 323 (1972) [hereinafter cited as White Noose].
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be found.5 So intense was debate on the violation issue, the Court felt

compelled to set the case for reargument just to consider the appropriate nature and scope of a remedy. 6 Over a year later, Chief Justice
Warren concluded for a unanimous Court that desegregation should
proceed with "all deliberate speed ' 7 in a manner fashioned by 8the dis'
trict courts employing the "traditional attributes of equity power."
The Supreme Court has consistently articulated its commitment to

eliminating state imposed racial segregation in public schools.

The

Court has uniformly rejected both overt and subtle attempts at circumvention of its Brown I mandate.9 As the firm posture of the Court became clear, attempts to subvert desegregation have become increasingly better disguised. The time for "deliberate speed" has passed °
and the Court has placed upon school and state officials the affirmative
duty to end segregation and its effects."1 The courts have also realized
that the spectre of segregation can exist in school systems of the North
where segregation has never been legislatively imposed.' 2
5. "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to
schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based
on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question
4(b),
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c)should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to
frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this
Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving
at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 n.13 (1954) [Brown I].
6. Id.
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [Brown II.
8. Id. at 300.
9. Compare Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) with United States v. Scotland
Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
10. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
11. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
12. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Court blurred the
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation in finding that plaintiffs' showing
of racially motivated acts in pupil assignment in one part of the city would be inferred
as existing in all parts. See generally Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Con-
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Over the twenty year period since Brown II, the Court has been
aware of the need for further clarification and guidance on the extent
of the remedy required to eliminate segregation of schools."3 Simple
repeal of the dual school system legislation has not been effective to
eliminate the problem in the South and has no application to the racial

imbalance in the unitary school systems of the North. In 1973, the
Supreme Court had its first occasion to examine what now seems to
be the outer limit of the equitable power of the federal courts to remedy racial imbalance in public schools. In Bradley v. School Board
a ' 4 the Court ended twelve years of school desegregation
[Richmond],
in Richmond, Virginia. By dividing equally, the Court affirmed the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversal of a district court order consolidating three counties into one school district to achieve racial balance.
The failure of Justice Powell to participate produced the deadlock
which lacks precedential effect outside the Fourth Circuit. 15 The full
Court has again considered the issue in Bradley v. Milliken [Detroit],
decided on the final day of the 1973 term.'

The Court has consistently relied on its equity powers to fashion
relief once a constitutional violation has been shown. Although
courts have often recognized that the equity power is not without
limit l' Detroit represents the first time the Supreme Court has articulated the bounds of a definite limit to the equity power in school segre-

gation cases. The purpose of this article is to explain this limit as announced in Detroit. Examination will first center on the remedies

ordered in the desegregation cases previously adjudicated. Specific atstitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Goodman]. Professor Goodman suggests that a showing of de facto segregation alone
could mandate a less stringent remedy than that required after a showing of de jure segregation. Id. at 437. The Court's analysis in Keyes indicates that the situations where
plaintiffs can only show de facto segregation are likely to be rare since school authorities
must bear the burden of showing their apparently racially motivated actions were not
so motivated. 413 U.S. at 203. Justice Powell seems prepared to make this step directly. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). But see Spencer v. Kugler,
326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.NJ. 1971), affd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
13. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
14. 412 U.S. 92 (1973), aff'g, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
15. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S.
205, 213-14 (1910).
16. 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
17. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 474 F.2d 46
(6th Cir. 1973).
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tention will be focused on the consolidation order at issue in Detroit18
and the reaction of the lower court jurists that considered it. The Supreme Court's opinion in Detroit will finally be examined with a
counterpoint offered by theories and previous attitudes of the justices
demonstrating that the outcome, while regrettable, was to a large degree predictable.
Remedies for Segregation: Brown H to Swann
The starting point for understanding the limits on the equitable
power to remedy segregation must be the cases following Brown I in
which the Court sought to provide guidance for the district courts upon
which the task of determining the detailed decree devolved. 19
Special consideration was given during the 1954 Term to the question of appropriate remedy for desegregation. In Brown II the Court
followed its usual practice and remanded the cases to the lower courts.
Chief Justice Warren gave only the most general guidance:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided
by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a
facilty for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.
These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of
equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in
admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination
of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems
operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth
in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take
into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles
in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saybe aling that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot
20
lowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.
One may well wonder why the Court found necessary a year's delay
in fashioning an order of such obvious and logical simplicity. 2 ' The
point of debate seemed to center on the propriety of a gradual versus
an immediate decree and the Court apparently took cognizance of the
18. 484 F.2d 215, 243-45 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd. 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
19. While the Supreme Court itself has the authority to fashion a decree of its own
specific enough for any circumstance presented by a case, 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970), it
favors the practice or remanding a case for a decree by the lower courts. Note, Supreme
Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation Cases, 64 YALE L.J. 124, 135
(1954) [hereinafter cited as The Decrees].
20. Brown I[, 349 U.S. 294, 300.
21. See Braucher, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARv. L. REv.
119, 123 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Braucher].
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profound sociological and psychological impact an immediate decree
would have on the dual school systems of the South.22 While some
northern critics would have favored an immediate order, 23 others felt
the Court's approach sound, though they recognized that a gradual decree invited dilatory tactics.24
Dilatory tactics and worse ensued as the legislatures and public officials of the dual system states openly sought to frustrate the Court's
order. 2 By September, 1957, less than one third of the school districts
segregated at the time of Brown I were even superficially desegregated,
and the pace appeared to be slowing.2 6 An early prediction of a generation of litigation was proving -to be a realistic appraisal and the failure of the Civil Rights Act of 195727 to provide for desegregation left
28
the federal judiciary to implement the Brown II mandate.
The Court's initial guidance also proved insufficient. The district
courts that were initially to order compliance decrees were uncertain
not only as to pace but as to just what result was intended, since the
Brown II Court had failed to define a "racially nondiscriminatory school
system." 29 Seeking to give Brown II minimum impact, courts con22. The Decrees,supra note 19, at 133. One commentator has found curious and
tragic the Court's adoption of the sociologists' arguments in finding a violation in Brown
I but failing to follow their recommendation for an immediate order of integration in
Brown II. Clark, The Social Scientists: The Brown Decision and Contemporary Confusion in ARGUMENT xxxi, xxxli (L.Friedman ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
23. The Decrees,supra note 19, at 133 n.36.
24. "The Court's 1955 decision was a distinct anticlimax after the 1954 opinion,
but even as a matter of hindsight it is hard to suggest how the Court could have decided
better except perhaps by deciding sooner. Its directions are likely to have the desired
effect on state and local officials who are seeking conscientiously to desegregate and who
have popular support for their efforts; lower courts are left free to prod-for example
to overcome inertia when legislation is needed.
"In the deep South, a final decree may well turn out to be merely the opening shot
in a long delaying action." Braucher, supra note 21, at 123.
25. See generally McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U.L. Ruv. 991 (1956). Noting that two years after Brown I, eight
Southern states still maintained segregated schools, Professor McKay discussed the use
of interposition and legislative delay as techniques for avoiding the Brown H mandate.
Id. at 1016-59.
26. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": Legislative Reaction and Judicial Development 1956-57, 43 VA. L. REv. 1205, 1206, 1245 (1957) [hereinafter cited as McKay Il].
27. Act of Sept. 9, 1957, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 Stat. 634.
28. McKay II, supra note 26, at 1206; Comment, What Remedies Are Available
to Enforce the Supreme Court's Mandate to Desegregate and Who May Use Them, 9
HASI GS L".167 (1958).
29. 349 U.S. at 301.
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cluded that the case required only the opportunity to attend any school
chosen regardless of race.80 Consonant with this interpretation, most
southern states enacted "pupil placement" laws. 3 The pupil placement laws required all children to be assigned initially to their old segregated schools but given the freedom to elect transfer to a school for-

merly reserved for members of the other race. This practice was condemned in the mid-sixties by the courts of appeals because the initial

assignments were impermissibly made on the basis of race.3"
Following the rejection of the "pupil placement" laws some
schools adopted nonracially classified residential zoning plans, often
supplemented with transfer options. The new vogue became "freedom
of choice" plans which permitted pupils to select their own schools in
the first instance. Should overcrowding occur, priority was granted to
those residing nearest the school. Such plans were generally viewed
as consistent with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare

desegregation guidelines established in 1965 as conditions of eligibility
for federal financial assistance.3"

Some debate ensued between the

courts of appeals as to whether freedom of choice constituted in itself
30. On remand, the three-judge court in Briggs v. Elliot, a companion case in the
Brown decisions, stated:
"[]t is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme Court has decided
and what it has not decided in this case. It has not decided that the federal courts are
to take over or regulate the public schools of the states. It has not decided that the
states must mix persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend
schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. What
it has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny to any person
on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains. This, under the
decision of the Supreme Court, the state may not do directly or indirectly; but if the
schools which it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation of the Constitution is involved even though the children of different races voluntarily attend different
schools, as they attend different churches. Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools
they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely
forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the
state or state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals." 132 F. Supp.
776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). Not until 1967 was this language specifically disapproved.
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 389 n.2 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
31. McKay I, supra note 26, at 1214-21.
32. See, e.g., Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
33. U.S. OFFICE OF EDuc. HEW, GENERAL STATEMENT OF PoLICIES UNDER TITLE
VI OF THE CIvL RIGiTs AcT OF 1964 RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF ELEMENTARY AND

SEcoNDARY ScHooLs (1965). See generally Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School
Pesegregationin th? South, 53 VA. L. REv.42, 64 (1967) [hercinfter Qted as Dunn].
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full compliance or was merely a step in the proper direction of racially
mixed schools." 4
The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in its second major decision designed to guide the district courts in making their desegregation orders. In Green v. County School Board3 5 the Court rejected
"freedom of choice" as an end in itself for compliance with the Brown
I mandate and viewed this new system as merely a means toward the
abolition of segregated schools. 36 New Kent County, Virginia was a
rural area with just two schools-the black and the white. Only fifteen
percent of the black children had opted to attend the white school while
none of the white children had switched to the black school since the
board had adopted the plan in 1965. Freedom of choice was acceptable only if it worked. The school board could not transfer its duty
to end segregation to the parents and pupils. Justice Brennan spoke
for a unanimous Court:
School Boards such as the respondent. . . operating state-compelled dual systems were . . . clearly charged with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch. . . . The burden on a school board today is to come
realistically to work, and promforward with a plan that promises
37
ises realistically to work now.
If the adoption of methods such as residential zoning would achieve
a greater degree of integration, the school board had a duty to implement these methods.3 8 The district courts were reminded of their duty
"to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan [to achieve] desegregation," 30 and "to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate
the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination
in the future.40
The courts rejected the notion that compliance with the guidelines could be conclusive
as to whether Brown I was satisfied, though entitled to great weight. Bowman v.
County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
34. Dunn, supra note 33, at 72. Compare Bowman v. County School Bd., 382
F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967) with United States v. Jefferson County Bd, of Educ., 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966).
35. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See generally The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARv. L. REv. 63, 111-18 (1968).
36. 391 U.S. at 440.
37. Id. at 437-39.
38. Id. at 441.
39. Id. at 439.
40, Id, ;t 438 n.4, The Court referred tq its renjedies in NLRB v. Newport News
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Green still left questions unanswered. Most notably the Court
continued to avoid defining the key operative concepts in its opinion
such as "dual system," "unitary system," "segregated," "integrated,"
and "racially identifiable." Nor did the Court indicate how much
weight was to be given other legitimate educational and administrative
policies in assessing a school board's desegregation plan:'
Armed with this limited guidance, the district courts began assessing school integration plans anew.4 2 After three years, the Supreme
Court recognized the need for still further guidance in the area of permissible remedies and availed itself of the situation presented in Swann
v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education.43 Prior to Brown I respondent had operated a racially segregated system as required by state
law. In 1965 a "freedom of choice plan" was approved by the district
court,44 but plaintiffs moved for further relief after Green was decided.
Finding that the school board had failed to achieve a unitary system,
the court ordered new desegregation plans be submitted. A board plan
that left elementary schools largely unchanged in their racial composition was rejected and the court adopted instead its expert's plan which
grouped inner city black schools with suburban white schools to achieve
a racial balance consistent with the overall demographic makeup of the
community. 45 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the Fourth Circuit's objections to the degree of busing ordered
and affirmed the district court order in its entirety.
The school board must go further than the adoption of a facially
neutral assignment plan, for such a plan "may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory
location of school sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1937); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944) (theater chain guilty of monopolization required to
show lack of effect on competition in future acquisitions); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911) (antitrust violation permits court to "neutralize the extension and continually operating force which the possession of the power unlawfully
obtained has brought and will continue to bring about").
41. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. R-v. 63, 114 (1968). The Court
also failed to indicate the application Green was to have, if any, on Northern schools.
Id.
42. The Fifth Circuit alone heard 166 appeals in school cases from Dec. 2, 1969
to Sept. 24, 1970. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 n.5
(1971).
43. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See generally The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 3, 74-86 (1971).
44. 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), affd, 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966).
45. 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
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or maintain an artificial racial separation."4' 6 Toward this end the opinion held that district courts may use racial quotas as a starting point
for the degree of desegregation to be achieved, rezone school attendance districts, provide for majority to minority option transfers and
order the bus transportation of students.4"
While this decision was criticized as leaving many questions yet
unresolved, 48 it was another major step in defining the power of the
federal judiciary to remedy segregation. Indirectly, by affirming the
district court, the Supreme Court established the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district as an example of what a desegregated school system might
look like. Little deviation from uniform racial ,balance would be permitted in the secondary schools. At the lower levels an occasional onerace school would be permitted as long as the general percentage of
blacks in the system was reflected in the other schools. Again by indirection the Court suggested that financial considerations might limit the
scope of an order. In Swann additional expenditures of 1.5 percent
of the total district budget for busing students was approved. A practical limitation on the length of a busing trip was also suggested-thirtyfive minutes one-way was accepted as feasible and not detrimental to
the health of the children. 49 The local policies of school construction
were seen as forming a basis for a finding of continued maintenance
of a dual system."0 Finally, the Court acknowledged the existence of
a limit to the broad equity powers of the district courts:
The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution. . . . No
fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can be established as
to how
far a court can go, but it must be recognized that there are
limits5 1
Thus the court continued to add substance to the parameters of
the "practical flexibility" of the judicial power to remedy segregation.
The major question left by Swann could only be answered in the course
of history: Would further guidance be necessary?
46. 402 U.S. at 28.
47. Id. at 22-31.
48. Goodman, supra note 12, at 292; The Supreme Court 1970 Term, supra note
43, at 75-82. Among the questions left open is "the allocation of discretion among
school authorities, district courts, and appellate courts." Goodman at 292.
49. 402 U.S. at 30.
50. Id. at 20-21. These policies would evince a dual system even where not accompanied by previous statutory segregation. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
201-02 (1973).
51. 402 U.S. at 16, 28 (emphasis added). The chief justice seized upon this language again in rejecting the metropolitan remedy in Detroit, 94 S. Ct. at 3124. See text
accompanying notes 164-179, infra.
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The Metropolitan Consolidation Cases:
The "Inevitable Sequel"52
Even as the Court was making its decision in Swann, the district
courts in Richmond, Virginia and Detroit, Michigan had before them
the cases which would present the next and, possibly, final round of
Supreme Court litigation concerning the scope of the equity power to
deal with school segregation. The Richmond court ordered implementation of a plan developed by the school board which would consolidate
three separate county school systems 53 while the Detroit court concluded that a plan consolidating all or part of three metropolitan Michigan counties must be developed as the only effective method of achieving the desegregation ordered by Brown I.54 Both courts arrived at
this result after finding that integration of the core city school district
alone would still leave schools that were largely racially identifiable and
not consistent with the demographic structure of the larger metropolitan
community. 55 The Supreme Court ended the Richmond litigation by
dividing equally but the full panel has delivered its opinion in Detroit.
The case will have great impact on the future of school desegregation
for southern schools formerly statutorily segregated as well as for northern schools where segregation of a more devious sort is coming under
increasing attack."6
Bradley v. School Board [Richmond]

In May of 1970, some 52,000 pupils attended
schools. Of the 52,000 some 60 percent were black
were white.57 At all levels, the schools operated by
identifiably one-race schools,58 even though the board

Richmond city
and 40 percent
the board were
had operated a

52. The phrase was used by Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold in the oral argument of Bradley v. School Bd. [Richmond] before the Court. 41 U.S.L.W. 3577, 3579
(U.S. Apr. 23, 1973).
53. Bradley v. School Bd. [Richmond], 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd,
462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
54. Bradley v. Milliken [Detroit], 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affd, 484
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
55. 338 F. Supp. at 103, 345 F. Supp. at 916, citing earlier findings at 338 F. Supp.
582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
56. See Note, Consolidationfor Desegregationw The Unresolved Issue of the Inevitable Sequel, 82 YAE L.J. 1681, 1681-82 n.8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Inevitable
Sequel].
57. 338 F. Supp. at 71.
58. Of 61 schools operated, 52 were 85 percent one-race. Id. at 72-73. A similar
situation existed with respect to faeulty and staff,
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freedom of choice plan since 1966. In an earlier opinion, 59 the district
court rejected a new neighborhood assignment plan because it found
the pattern of severe residential segregation, resulting in part from
board action in construction of schools, would perpetuate the racial
identifiability of the system. It ordered the joinder of state education
officials as well as the school boards of adjoining counties to consider60
their participation in the maintenance of a dual system in Richmond
and to consider their duties to remedy that segregation. The principal
alleged participation of these parties was their cooperative efforts to
create and maintain school boundaries that had the effect of locking
blacks in the core city.
State Action
As is necessary in any desegregation case, any consideration of
remedy must be preceded by a finding of a constitutional violationa state imposed denial of equal protection of the laws. After the Supreme Court's decision in Green, racially identifiable schools were
equated with segregated schools. If such segregation was state imposed, there was a constitutional violation."' The district court in Richmond had little trouble finding racial identity in the schools and made
detailed findings to establish its conclusion that the local and state officials had acted to maintain the dual system that was statutorily abolished following Brown 11.62 The court found that school construction
policy and transportation of pupils were widely used to maintain the
segregated system.63 Local officials, with state concurrence, selected
school sites to coincide with the pattern of residential segregation, 4
then reinforced the pattern by drawing attendance lines to conform.
Pupil assignment plans, such as freedom of choice, also accentuated the
problem.6 5 The court did not confine its findings to acts by the Richmond board but found active participation by the boards of the suburban counties6" also.
The court also found significant participation on the part of state
59. Bradley v. School Bd., 317 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Va. 1970).
60. Bradley v. School Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Va. 1970).
61. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. The court's general findings encompassed 36 pages, 338 F. Supp. 79-116, while
its detailed findings covered another 113 pages. Id. at 116-229.
63. The court relied on language in Swann for support of its consideration of
school construction. Id. at 89, citing, 402 U.S. at 20-21.
64. Id. at 86-87, 127, 133.
65. Id. at 84.
66. Id. at 168,
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school officials. The starting point of this inquiry was the state's overall
responsibility for education. 7 Judge Merhige noted state concurrence
in local discriminatory acts68 and concluded by examining the effect of
state legislative attempts to frustrate desegregation, such as Virginia's
"massive resistance" plan.6 9 Although the court made occasional reference to Virginia's past history of dual school systems, the finding of
state action was premised on post-Brown I conduct by the defendants.
The Remedy
Having established by overwhelming evidence the constitutional
violation, Judge Merhige had little difficulty in perceiving the duty and
power to order consolidation of the tri-county school system with attendant busing.
[Tihe duty to take whatever steps are necessary to achieve the
greatest possible degree of desegration in formerly dual systems
by the elimination of racially identifiable schools is not circumby
scribed by school division boundaries created and maintained
70
the cooperative efforts of local and central State officials.
71
The mandate of Swann was broad enough to justify this action.
The court made much of its finding that the tri-county area was the
relevant community. Richmond was seen as the center of the metropolitan area, providing jobs and cultural leadership for the entire area.
The city boundary lines posed no physical barrier to the movement of
pupils. The court considered cases in which natural barriers such as
superhighways7' or railroad tracks7 3 had been ignored in desegregation
orders. "If physical demarcations do not limit the duty of the court
to use 'all available techniques' . . .so much the less should political
boundaries, when they coincide with no tangible obstacles and are unrelated to any administrative or educational needs. 7 4 The court examined situations in which school pupils had been transported across
political boundaries in Virginia and noted examples of tri-county co67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 93.
Id. at 83, 124-27.
Id. at 94-96.
Id. at 79-80.
"lit is the duty of a district court to intervene to 'eliminate .. .all vestiges

of state-imposed segregation.'"

Id. at 81-82, citing, Sivann, 402 U.S. 1, 15.

72. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs., 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
73. Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.
1969).
74. 338 F. Supp. at 83.
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operation in educational and other areas. 75 Virginia state officials had
substantial power to draw school district lines and could not avoid responsibility for correcting the dual system by delegating its boundary
76
line power to local officials.
The voting rights cases 77 were viewed as providing ample authority
for the proposition that state political subdivisions were not inviolate
when their strict observance would perpetuate a constitutional infringement. "Reynolds and its companion cases establish that denials of
equal protection may not be justified by reference to the needs of a
system of subordinate political entities, themselves the products of state
action. '78 The Supreme Court had long held that cities, towns, and
counties are mere political subdivisions of the state, which may grant
79
or withhold from them powers as it sees fit.
Judge Merhige found further support for his order in what he
called the "splinter" cases-where local political units were restrained
from seceding from larger school districts where the effect of such action was to maintain or increase segregation.80 Though not given the
force of a Supreme Court mandate at the time of his opinion, the judge
found the reasoning persuasive. If a separation and alteration of a
boundary line could be enjoined, this was action affecting political subdivisions of the state. Ignoring or changing boundary lines seemed
equally permissible.8 "
Armed with these conclusions, the court proceeded to adopt a
plan.
The court's order provided for the merger of the city and suburban
school systems and then divided the newly consolidated system into
six subdivisions. All but one of the subdivisions were irregular pieshaped configurations which began in central Richmond and extended out to the suburbs. The sixth subdivision encompassed a
large portion of rural Chesterfield County and did not extend into
ithe city of Richmond. Except for subdivision six, all subdivisions
75. "[Piast events in the metropolitan area and in Virginia betoken a willingness
-indeed an enthusiasm-to disregard political boundaries when needful to serve state
educational policies, among them racial segregation." Id. at 103.
76. Id. at 102.

77. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v.Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960).
78. 338 F. Supp. at 103.
79. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
80. E.g., United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972);
Wright v.Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). See generally, White
Noose, supra note 4, at 350-51.
81. 338 F. Supp. at 105-13.
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contained a racial mix approximating the racial mix for the entire
consolidated system, 67 percent white and 33 percent black. In order to effectuate an acceptable racial balance in each particular
school, a lottery system based on each child's birthday was to have
which individuals would be transported
been utilized to 8determine
2
out of their zone.

Substantial busing was involved, representing an increase of about 12
percent over existing levels,88 but in no case would the one-way trip
exceed 45 minutes to an hour,84 compatible with existing levels and
with the guidelines established in Swann.8 5
Judge Merhige's remedy of consolidation reflected his belief that
segregated "unitary" systems existing contiguously in an interrelated metropolitan area were incompatible with the fourteenth
amendment and the political subdivision lines must not interfere
with the remedy if a constitutional violation has been determined. 6

Unfortunately, his considered opinion failed to pass muster at the court
of appeals or at the Supreme Court.
The Fourth Circuit

In reversing Judge Merhige,"7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
took issue with both the finding of state action and the scope of the
equitable power to deal with segregation.88 Judge Craven, writing for

a five to one majority, accepted that there may have been some minimal
state action in maintaining housing segregation.8 9 The court rejected
the district court's conclusion, however, that there had been any "joint

interaction" between the school districts themselves and state officials
for the purpose of promoting segregation.9 0 There was a complete ab-

sence of any evidence of overt racial gerrymandering in the drawing
82. White Noose, supra note 4, at 338-39.
83. 338 F. Supp. at 188. The number of pupils bused would increase 10,000 to

78,000.
84. Id.
85. 402 U.S. at 30.
86. White Noose, supra note 4, at 341.
87. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S.
92 (1973).
88. "May a United States District Judge compel one of the States of the Union
to restructure its internal government for the purpose of achieving racial balance in the
assignment of pupils to the public schools? We think not, absent invidious discrimination in the establishment or maintenance of local governmental unit-.... " d. at 1060.
Judge Winter, dissenting, finds this an oversimplification. Id. at 1075.
89. Id. at 1066.
90. Id. at 1065.
91. Id. at 1064.
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of the school district boundaries."' The court failed to perceive any
difference in the demographic patterns at work in Richmond from
92
those at work in the other major metropolitan areas.
Although the court found that the case failed to present requisite
state action, the opinion also considered the question of an appropriate
remedy. Concluding that each of the school districts was now unitary
within the meaning of Swann and Green,9" the court registered its extreme distaste for the consolidation remedy. Judge Craven emphasized the importance of Virginia history, traditional emphasis on local
school control, problems of financing and the inherent educational disadvantage in such a large system.94 The court felt that Judge Merhige
had failed to perceive in Swann's broad mandate the qualifying language concerning a limit on his power to fashion remedies in school
95
cases.
[W]e think the adoption of the Richmond Metropolitan Plan in
toto. . . is the equivalent, despite disclaimer, of the imposition of
a fixed racial quota. The Constitution imposes no such requirement, and imposition as a matter of substantive constitutional right
of any particular degree of racial balance is beyond the power of
a district court.96
The court apparently felt that Judge Merhige had gone beyond the use
of racial quotas "as a starting point" in fashioning a desegregation plan.
The Fourth Circuit also felt that the district court had not taken
proper consideration of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the equity
power. The circuit judges saw the states' power over their school districts and other political subdivisions as near-plenary.9 7 They recognized that Gomillion v. Lightfoot' 8 proscribed the use of this plenary
power as an instrument for circumventing the equal protection clause
but failed to find in the facts before them such a circumvention.9 9 Richmond, Henrico, and Chesterfield Counties had removed all vestiges of
state imposed segregation---"further intervention by the district court
was neither necessary nor justifiable."' 100 Readjustment of the racial
92. "Indeed this record warrants no other conclusion than that the forces influencing demographic patterns in New York, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Atlanta and
other metropolitan areas have operated in the same way in the Richmond metropolitan
area to produce the same result." Id. at 1066.
93. Id. at 1070.
94. Id. at 1066-68.
95. 402 U.S, at 24.
96. 462 F.2d at 1064.
97. Id. at 1068-69.
98. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
99. 462 F.2d at 1069.
100. Id.
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composition of student bodies was not required by Swann once "the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished. . ...
,0 Arguing back toward their initial rejection of the state action finding, the
court concluded that Judge Merhige had overstepped his powers.10 z
Judge Winter, in dissent, offered a persuasive counterargument.'0 3
In his view the majority had erroneously decided both the state action
and the remedy issues. He failed to perceive the basis for the court's
conclusion that the affirmative duty to desegregate had been accomplished. The district court should not be required to show that there
had been a conspiracy among defendants to perpetuate segregation.
The actions of the individual boards and state officials had the unchallenged effect of "locking" blacks in Richmond. "[Wilhether acting
singly or in concert, action and inaction, . . . in the several regards described are all state action and it is to overall state action that the four04
teenth amendment is addressed.'1
Once the hurdle of state action had been passed, the court's duty
upon default of the state was clear-to end racial segregation in the
relevant community. Consolidation was not an abuse of discretion. 105
"This record reflects no reason to respect existing political boundaries
except that some of them have always existed."' 0 Judge Winter found
support in the voting rights cases and in the language of Brown II and
Swann for revision of district lines as a permissible remedy.10 7 He was
not unaware of the equity power's limits, but felt their bounds lay on
the practical side of the order and not on federalism principles in the
Tenth Amendment. While his position was not vindicated at the Supreme Court, Judge Winter would find comfort in the Sixth Circuit approach to consolidation.
Bradley v. Milliken [Detroit]
Much of the frustration produced by the Supreme Court's division
in Richmond has been resolved. 0 8 A detailed look at the lower courts'
101. Id., citing, 402 U.S. at 31-32.
102. The court felt controlled by Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.NJ.
1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). There, plaintiffs had urged a state-wide redistricting of schools, but the court failed to find a constitutional violation in their bare assertion that the schools in New Jersey were racially identifiable.
103. 462 F.2d at 1071-80 (Winter, J.,dissenting).
104. Id. at 1076.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1077.
107. Id. at 1078, citing, Brown 1I,349 U.S. at 300-01 and Swann, 402 U.S. at 27.
108. The Detroit case will not be the only one affected by this opinion. Consolida-
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action in Detroit provides the background for understanding the resolution of the case at the Supreme Court.
The DistrictCourt: State Action and Remedy
Although schools in Michigan have never been maintained in a
dual system by law, the factual pattern of segregation before Judge
Roth was not unlike that found by Judge Merhige in Richmond. The
action commenced in 1970 when plaintiffs and the NAACP attacked
a Michigan statute which had the effect of nullifying a Detroit school
board plan of partial high school desegregation. Plaintiffs also alleged
that the Detroit school system was and is segregated on the basis of
race. After legal maneuvering, the Sixth Circuit first held that the
Michigan statute had the effect alleged' 0 9 and then ordered a trial on
the merits of the segregation claim."10 At that trial, the district court
found that the following test had been met:
1. The State, through its officers and agencies, and usually,
the school administration, must have taken some action or actions
with a purpose of segregation.
2. This action. . must'have created or aggravated segregation in the schools in question.
3. A current condition of segregation exists."'
The court felt a finding of de jure segregation should be unnecessary," 2
but found ample evidence upon which to base such a finding. The
board had shaped school attendance zones to conform -with segregated
residential patterns, adopted optional attendance zones for "transition"
areas," 3 and transported black pupils from overcrowded black schools
past white schools-all acts of segregation." 4 The state defendants
were also culpable. They held ultimate responsibility for education in
tion remedies are under consideration elsewhere. Indianapolis has progressed furthest
where the court has found de jure segregation in the entire metropolitan area. United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), a~fd, 474 F.2d
81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
109. Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970).
110. Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971).
111. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Though he
did not have the Supreme Court decision to guide him, Judge Roth seemed to make the
same sort of findings approved in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1973).
112. 338 F. Supp. at 592.
113. A "transition" area is one in which the demographic pattern is changing from
one race to another.
114. 338 F. Supp. at 593. The court-also noted that the board failed in its affirmative duty to use school attendance lines to counteract residential segregation. Id.
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Michigan. 1 5 The state department of education was found to exercise
supervision and, in many cases, to provide financial support over all aspects of school administration." 6 Theirs was the responsibility to provide pupils with an education without discrimination as to race.117
Having found a constitutional violation, -the court turned to the
consideration of a remedy. Judge Roth directed defendants, city and
state, to submit plans for desegregation encompassing both "Detroitonly" and "metropolitan" areas. After holding hearings to consider the
plans submitted, the court concluded that segregation relief could not
be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of the city of
Detroit.1 8 From the plans presented, Judge Roth adopted one which
involved consolidating fifty-four separate school districts, encompassing
the bulk of a tri-county area. Transfer of pupils would be two-way.
Each school would have at least 10 percent black faculty and staff. The
financial arrangements would be examined to insure proper distribution
of costs." 9 The court did not purport to find segregative acts on the
part of the school officials in the suburban counties.'2 0 The district
judge concluded his duty was to effect "prompt and maximum actual
desegregation of the public schools by all reasonable, feasible, and
practicable means available.' 2 '
Since the state defendants were burdened with the primary responsibility, their plan was the one to be given deference and consideration. Judge Roth found their six plans all lacking.12 2 Upon such default, he felt bound to order a remedy. His premise that the tri-county
area was the relevant community was reached in a method similar to
that employed by Judge Merhige' 23 and Judge Winter 24 in Richmond.
He noted the lack of relationship between the school districts and other
governmental services, noted that some school services were already
provided for on a-metropolitan basis, and he took notice of other tricounty cooperation and the general pattern of life in the area as reflecting a single metropolitan community.' 25 His objective was
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 593-94.
MctE. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
Id. at 917-19.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922-23.
338 F. Supp. at 86-87.
462 F.2d at 1072 (Winter, ., dissenting).
345 F. Supp. at 935.
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to establish the minimum constitutional framework within which
now and hereafter in a
the system of public schools may operate 120
racially unified, non-discriminatory fashion.
Since the court's decision was directed primarily at the state defendants, the court did not see fit even to consider any federalism arguments concerning the inviolability of the political boundaries. Financing was no problem. "Funds must either be raised or reallocated,
where necessary, to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional
rights and to insure that no such unconstitutional neglect recurs
again."'1 2 7 The plan did not envisage a trip of more than forty-five
minutes to an hour, nor did it contemplate the busing of an inordinate
number of children.128 Judge Roth was convinced that desegregation
of schools throughout the Detroit area was required to overcome the
constitutional violation.
The Court of Appeals
Sitting en banc, the nine judges of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained Judge Roth. 29 Writing for five of his brethren, Chief
Judge Phillips held that substantial evidence supported the findings of
constitutional violations resulting in systemwide racial segregation of
the Detroit public schools, that a constitutionally adequate system of desegregated schools could not be established within the Detroit school
district's geographic limits, and that the order requiring preparation of
a metropolitan plan represented a proper exercise of the district court's
equity power.
The court was aware that the case was breaking new ground and,
accordingly, it stayed the implementation of the district court's plan
pending appeal. In considering first the issue of the violations, the
court examined in detail the findings made by Judge Roth and the conclusions drawn therefrom. Judge Phillips' opinion set out at some
length testimony of various witnesses concerning the method, purpose,
and effect of school and state official action in drawing attendance
zones, school construction, and busing to preserve racial identity of
schools.' 80 He concluded:
126. Id. at 936.
127. Id. at 938, citing, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377
U.S. 218 (1964).
128. Id. at 929-31. The number of students bused would increase from 300,000 to
310,000 or 40% of the school population, a figure comparing favorably with the statewide average.
129. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
130. Id. at 221-41.
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The discriminatory practices on the part of the Datroit Scrool
Board and the State of Michigan revealed by this record are significant, pervasive and causally related to the substantial amount of
segregation found in the Detroit school system by the District
Judge.131
Michigan's declared public policy of integrated schools was of no comfort to these defendants in the face of constitutional violations in the
record. "Even if the segregation practices were a bit more subtle than
the compulsory segregation statutes of Southern States, they were none13
theless effective."'
Judge Phillips proceeded to the next level of inquiry-the district
court's ruling that no Detroit-only desegregation plan was possible. As
with the finding of segregation, the majority adopted the careful reasoning of the district judge, setting out much of his opinion. 13 The court
concluded that a Detroit-only plan would leave the school system still
racially identifiable. "[W]e see no validity to an argument which asserts that the constitutional right to equality before the law is hemmed
in by the boundaries of a school district."' 34 The district court's findings on the status of local control of schools in Michigan were also examined. Central responsibility lay with the state. On several occasions it had directly intervened in local affairs. The need for a
metropolitan desegregation plan was even greater when the state had
actively participated in the discrimination. Furthermore, the court perceived that a remedy limited to Detroit alone would have the unconscionable effect of making the Brown I mandate a nullity. 13 5
Though aware that the court's dissatisfaction with a Detroit-only
plan had been articulated, Judge Phillips examined the equity power
of the federal judiciary for possible limitations that would preclude a
metropolitan plan and found none. Brown II's language referring to
"revision of school districts and attendance areas" was influential. 130
The court found support from Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
131. Id. at 241.
132. Id. at 242. The court followed the lead of the Seventh Circuit which had sustained a similar finding as to Indianapolis. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs.,
474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
133. 484 F.2d at 243-45.
134. Id. at 245.
135. "The instant case calls up haunting memories of the now long overruled and
discredited 'separate but equal doctrine' of Plessey v. Furguson. . . . If we hold that

school district boundaries are absolute barriers
lify Brown. ...." Id. at 249.
136. 349 U.S. at 300-01.

..

we would be opening a way to nul-

This same passage was found authoritative by Judge

Winter of the Fourth Circuit. 462 F.2d at 1078.
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Madison13 7 for the equitable maxim "no right -without a remedy." The
"splinter cases"'138 were also persuasive. "If school boundary lines

cannot be changed for an unconstitutional purpose, it follows logically
that existing boundary lines cannot be frozen for an unconstitutional
purpose."'' x3

To dispel the criticism that they overlooked Tenth

Amendment limitations, the court took pains to distinguish Richmond.
Crucial was the different status of the state education officials in Michigan and in Virginia. Michigan officials clearly possessed the power to
effectuate the order contemplated.' 4
The court concluded with a summary of the equitable duties and
tools available to the district judge and the legal authority for their use.
The summary traced much of the previous history of school desegregation.' 4 ' The whole panoply of remedial tools outlined in Swann were

available to be used.1 42 Financing was no problem. "[A] District
Court may order that public funds be expended, particularly when such
an expenditure is necessary to meet the minimum requirements mandated by the Constitution.' 43 Chief Judge Phillips had set the stage

for the Supreme Court's second attempt at the "inevitable sequel."
Issues at the Supreme Court
While the issues posed by Chief Judge Phillips for the Sixth Circuit provided the general framework for the consideration of the Supreme Court, 44 the Sixth Circuit dissenters, like the majority in Rich137. "'The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the law furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
138. United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). See note 80, supra, and accompanying text.
139. 484 F.2d at 250.
140. Id. at 250-51.
141. Id. at 252-55 (delay no longer tolerable, state imposed segregation completely
removed, eliminate past effects, resegregation impermissible).
142. Id. at 255-58 (racial ratios, noncontiguous zoning, busing).
143. Id. at 258, citing, inter alia, Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,
233 (1964).
144. "1. Are the District Court's findings of fact pertaining to constitutional violations resulting in system-wide racial segregation of the Detroit Public Schools supported
by substantial evidence or are they clearly erroneous?
"2. [Clan a constitutionally adequate system of desegregated schools be established within the geographic limits of the Detroit school district?
"3. [D]oes the District Judge's order requiring preparation of a metropolitan plan
for cross-district assignment and transportation of school children throughout the Detroit
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mond, accurately anticipated the Court's thinking. Three members of
the nine member panel wrote dissenting opinions. All had the same
basic difficulty with the majority's decision-the failure of the district
judge to find, or even take proofs of, a constitutional violation by the
suburban school districts-though the three were not in accord as to
the effect of this error.
Judge William E. Miller wrote the shortest opinion because he felt
the district judge's failure to allow the suburban defendants the opportunity to present evidence made any adjudication by the Sixth Circuit
premature. 14 Behind this procedural stance was his conviction that the
non-Detroit defendants could not be included in any desegregation plan
until an affirmative finding had been made that they had committed
acts of de jure segregation.14
Also objecting to Judge Roth's failure to allow the outside school
districts to be heard on the segregation issue and the propriety of a metropolitan plan, Judge Kent viewed the impact differently from his
brother Miller. 147 Since no acts were shown other than the de jure
segregation of the Detroit system, plaintiffs can ask for no remedy other
than the establishment of a unitary system within Detroit. Judge Kent
adopted as his byword the phrase "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy."' 48
Absent proofs, which clearly were not taken, to establish a violation
of the constitutional rights of these plaintiffs by the suburban school
district personnel and by the State of Michigan in laying out suburban school district lines it would appear that we are in complete
and absolute conflict with the prior decisions of this Court.149
Judge Kent found no law to support what he felt to be the majority's
premise--" 'big city school systems for blacks surrounded by suburban
metropolitan area represent a proper exercise of the equity power of the District Court?"
Id. at 221.
145. Id. at 283-84 (Miller, J., dissenting).

146.

f any one of these issues is resolved in favor of parties outside the Detroit

School District, the nature and scope of a remedy embracing outlying districts would

not be reached." Id. at 284.
147. Id. at 274-83 (Kent, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. Id. at 275, citing, Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. This became the focus for the Su-

preme Court majority. See text accompanying notes 168-174, infra.
149. Id. at 276, citing, Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of EFduc., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). This case and others following its rationale
have been strongly criticized. "Deal . . . strongly supported the Cincinnati 'neighborhood school' plan and school construction policies which concededly aggravated existing

racial imbalance."

White Noose, supra note-4, at 327.
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school systems for whites cannot represent equal protection of the

law.'

9150

Judge Weick's opinion""' raised the most far-reaching issues because he articulated his objection to the majority position beyond the
failure to find violations in the suburban districts. Along with his fellow dissenters, Judge Weick found the failure to allow the suburban
districts a meaningful opportunity to be heard an unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law. In his view, however, this was but one
of many reversible errors. Furthermore, acceptance of the theory that
proof need not be made against suburbia because the state defendants
have committed the violation posed Eleventh Amendment problems of
sovereign immunity.' 52 Accordingly, plaintiffs should have been required to bear the burden of proving violations by the non-Detroit
boards.
In many respects Judge Weick mirrored the majority view in the
Fourth Circuit in Richmond. Like the Richmond court, he failed to
see how school assignments have caused or can relieve the concentration of blacks in the inner city.' 5 3 Like the Richmond court, he found
Spencer v. Kugler 54 controlling because "[i]n none of the schools of
which the plaintiffs complain is any black pupil 'segregated' from any
white pupil."'' 55 Like the Richmond court, he found the district court
plan tantamount to the imposition of racial quotas prohibited in
Swann.' 50 Like the Richmond court, he failed to see how unitary
schools in Detroit with a racial mix of 66 percent black and 34 percent
white would fail to satisfy any constitutional mandate in Brown I or any
57
other desegregation case.'
Judge Weick called the district court to task for presuming to use
the judiciary to attain a social goal. 1 58 He, too, found reprehensible
150. 484 F.2d at 276. The phrase had been in the slip opinion of the panel which
first heard-Detroitbut was omitted from the majority en banc opinion.
151. Id. at 259 (Weick, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 271-72.
153. Id. at 260.
154. 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.NJ. 1971), affd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
155. 484 F.2d at 261.
156. "The metropolitan plan violates this principle which was applicable only to
dual systems. It is even worse when the District Court applies broader orders to a unitary system than have ever been applied to dismantling of-a dual system." Id. at 263.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 260-61. Yet later in his opinion he criticizes the district court for failing
to allow defendant's sociologist to testify. Id. at 269. He urges reconsideration of the
testimony of sociological experts relied upon by the Brown I court:- Id. at 265- - -
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the majority's premise concerning the "white noose' as a denial of
equal protection of the laws. He found cross-district busing a potential
denial of equal protection of the laws to the individuals required to be
bussed. "[Courts] may not enter orders in school desegregation cases
which impinge upon and violate the constitution [sic] rights of other
1 59

persons.,,

The dissent framed the issues for adjudication by the Supreme
Court. As Judge Weick's opinion sharply indicated, the case was much
the same as the Richmond case before the Court last term.16 0 Though
the lower Detroit courts did not have the benefit of the. Keyes v. School
District No. 1 [Denver]1 61 opinion, the findings of segregation within
Detroit proper seemed to satisfy the tests of Keyes.'62 The remaining
issues were ones of first impression for the Court.
If Detroit schools are segregated, what is the remedy for that segregation? Swann permitted mathematical ratios as "a starting point in
the process of shaping a remedy.'1 63 In Swann, the ratios used pertained solely to the particular school district. Do Brown I and the equal
protection clause require more than that when the geographic area in
which a desegregation order is feasible extends beyond the political
bounds of the school district found to be segregated? Can a constitu,
tionally adequate system of desegregated schools be established within
the Detroit corporate limits? If the resulting balance is unsatisfactory,
must the other districts being incorporated be found to have participated in the discrimination? Finally, if the proper violation is shown,
do the state interests protected by federalism and the Tenth Amendment in the structure of its political subdivision and in local control over
schools limit the equity power to order a consolidation remedy?
These are questions the Court set about to resolve. The case was
difficult. In a long term filled with difficult cases, the Court did not
announce its decision until July 25, well into the usual summer recess
159. Id. at 264, citing, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
160. One commentator suggests that Richmond and Detroit are reconcilable-on the
ground that the greater local control in Virginia required an imputation of segregative
intent to all tri-county boards while no such imputation was necessary in Michigan.
Note, Segregative Intent and the Single Governmental Entity in School Desegregation,
1973 DuKE LJ. 1111.
161. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Detroit was delivered
some two weeks prior to Keyes.
162. 94 S. Ct. 3124 n.18. Compare Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990,
1000 (10th Cir. 1971) with Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592-93 (E.D. Mich.
1971).
163. 402 U.S. at 25.
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period. The analysis adopted followed the logical seqence of searching the record first for a proper finding of a constitutional violation and
then proceeding to the question of remedy. This method may have
been in part responsible for the result reached. While the majority
would argue that no metropolitan violation was shown, the more accurate assessment seems to be that a violation was shown for which the
only effective remedy affected parties who, themselves, had not directly
participated-in the violation.
The Supreme Court
Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority opinion in which he
was joined by the other three Nixon appointees, Blackmun, Powell and
The chief justice
Rehnquist and Eisenhower appointee Stewart.'6
initially outlined the history of the litigation before proceeding to the
substance of the opinion.' 65 The tone of the majority approach was
reflected in his characterization of the Brown I mandate.
The target of the Brown holding was clear and forthright: the
elimination of state mandated or deliberately maintained dual
school systems66with certain schools for Negro pupils and others for
White pupils.'
As the balance of the opinion made clear, the prior course of
broad, expansive treatment of school desegregation remedies was coming to an end. The chief justice reviewed the Court decisions that
had previously examined the extent of the equity power in desegregation cases.' 6 7 He focused on Swann's proscription that the remedy
must be aimed at "the condition that offends the Constitution." The
offending condition in Detroit was the segregation within the Detroit
city school system.' 6 8 The nature of this violation was to be determinative of the scope of the remedy. 69
In revising and remanding for a new decree, the Court took the
district judge and court of appeals to task because to the Court
it seems clear that [they] shifted the primary focus from a Detroit
remedy to the metropolitan area only because of their conclusion
that total desegregation of Detroit would70not produce the racial balance which they perceived as desirable.'
164. Bradley v. Milliken, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
165. Id. at 3116-23.
166. Id. at 3123.
167. See text accompanying notes 19-50, supra.
168. The Court had no trouble with the finding that the Detroit City schools were
subject to de jure segregation. 94 S.Ct. at 3124 n.18.
169. Id. at 3124.
170. Id. at 3125.
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The Chief Justice noted that Swann did not require any particular degree of racial balance though the existence of one race schools placed
a burden on school officials to show the nondiscriminatory nature of
the assignments. 1 ' Swann had sanctioned the use of racial quotas as
a "starting point.' 1 72 When the lower courts looked at Detroit alone,
the resulting degree of racial balance was widely divergent from the
population ratio of the entire metropolitan region-the area in which
integration was physically feasible.
The majority took exception to this approach. Unless an interdistrict violation could be shown, the school district boundary lines were
sacrosanct.' 7 3 While the Court restated the constitutional precept that
state law including political subdivisions must give way to the Fourteenth Amendment, 74 it made clear that a showing of a constitutional
violation having segregatory impact across district lines would be required to offset the principles of federalism which supported the inviolability of the school district boundaries.
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than
local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long
been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support
for public schools and to quality of the educa17 5
tional process.
The chief justice attached great importance to the historic system of
local control over schools in Michigan. The Court conjured up an administrative Pandora's box whose horrors would be unleashed with the
sanction of an inter-district remedy. Taxing, finance, curriculum and
other administrative concerns in the multidistrict area would be under
the initial province of the district judge whose powers were deemed
unequal to the task.' 7 6 Consequently, an inter-district remedy would
171. Id.
172. 402 U.S. at 22-31. See text accompanying note 47, supra.
173. 94 S. Ct. at 3125-31.
"Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for inter-district relief, but, the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our county." Id. at 3125.
"Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside
by consolidating the separate inits for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district
remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one
district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." Id. at 3127.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 3125-26.
176. "But it is obvious from the scope of the inter-district remedy itself that absent
a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to school districts the District
Court will become first, a de facto 'legislative authority' to resolve these complex ques-
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be permissible only where it was "shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district,"' 77 or shown that all districts encompassed
in the desegregation order had participated in the discriminatory activity. Any other result was seen as providing remedy that put the victims
in a different position than that which they would have enjoyed absent
the discrimination.' 78
Chief Justice Burger searched the record and, save for one isolated instance of an inter-district violation, found no evidence that the
state or any district engaged in activity with a cross-district effect. 179
This result was not surprising since the trial court had not taken proofs
as to possible violations by the metropolitan districts. Participation by
state officials, with power over all Michigan schools, in the Detroit segregation did not provide state action sufficient ,to justify the inter-district
remedy. The Court concluded that the lower courts had applied an
erroneous standard and returned the case for the adoption and implementation of a Detroit-only desegregation plan.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, 8" highlights the problem the majority had with the lack of factual showing of overt segregative acts having an inter-district effect. He does not reject an interdistrict remedy out of hand.' 8" "The courts were in error for the simple reason that the remedy they thought necessary was not commensurate with the constitutional violation found."' 82 The importance of local school control and the difficulty of judicial school administration
would not permit this broad remedy absent an affirmative showing.
This showing had not been made in his eyes. "No record has been
made in this case showing that the racial composition of the Detroit
school population or that residential patterns within Detroit and in the
tions, and then the 'school superintendent' for the entire area. This is a task which few,
if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of control
of schools through their elected representatives." Id. at 3126-27.
177. Id. at 3127.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 3129-31.
180. Id. at 3131-33 (Stewart, J., concurring).
181. "This is not to say, however, that an inter-district remedy of the sort approved
by the Court of Appeals would not be proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations. Were it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines, . . ., by transfer of
school units between districts, . . ., or by purposeful racially discriminatory use of state
housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for transfer of pupils across district lines
or for restructuring of districts lines might well be appropriate." Id. at 3132.
182. Id.
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surrounding areas were in any significant measure caused by governReversal was therefore proper as a matter of
mental activity."'' 8
course.

To a large degree, the outcome in Detroit was predictable. A
careful examination of the Court's earlier desegregation opinions provided a few significant clues to the justices' inclinations. Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia'84 and its companion case, United States
v. Scotland Neck Board of Education,'8" were the only desegregation
cases decided in a written opinion by the Court as presently constituted.
In both cases, the majority held that a municipality, formerly part of
a county school system, could not separate its schools from that county
system where the effect would be to create a racial disparity in the systems and hinder the desegregation effort. In Wright, the separation
would have established a 48 percent white, 52 percent black city system while altering the ratio in the county system from 34:66 to 28:72.
Justice Stewart, writing for a five man majority, found this effect,
coupled with a fear of white flight from the city, disparate facilities,
and the city's timing,18 6 violated the constitutional mandate of Brown .
Scotland Neck presented a more compelling situation. There, the
new ratios would have been 57:43 in the city, and 11:89 in the county
compared to a previous county ratio of 22:78. Also telling was special
state legislation required to effect this plan, sought just as a full desegregation decree was to be implemented. Even the four Wright dissenters were constrained to concur in the decision of the Court in Scotland
Neck.
The majority opinion in Wright shows the continued importance
those members of the Court attach to ,the ethnic ratios in the schools.
Though consistently eschewing racial ratios as the sole index of the desegregated system, the decisions of the Court demonstrate their prominent feature in finding a constitutional violation.'8 7 The Court has not
found a system to lack meaningful desegregation simply because blacks
comprise a majority of the school population.' 8 Nonetheless, the
183. Id. at 3133 n.2.
184. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
185. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
186. Wright, 407 U.S. at 464-66.
187. Chief Justice Burger chastises the majority on this point. Id. at 474. Yet even
the unanimous decisions of the Court reflect this. E.g., Swann, Davis, Green.
188. E.g., Scotland Neck, Davis; listed by the Chief Justice in Detroit. 94 S. Ct.
at 3128 n.22. Chief Justice Burger criticized Justice Marshall for his apparent adoption
of the opposite position. Id.
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Court had never found a school system integrated when the racial disparity between parts of the system is as great as exists between Detroit
and the rest of the area of feasible integration. 8 9
Chief Justice Berger's dissenting opinion,' 90 in which Justices
Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, contrasted with their concurrence in Scotland Neck, suggested they would find a Detroit-only plan
satisfactory and indicated a retreat from thq numbers game. They
found adequate a system in which the "assignment of children to
schools would depend solely on their residence,"' 19 absent other factors. " it is quite true that the racial ratios of the two school systems
would differ, but the elimination of such disparities is not the mission
of desegregation."' 92 Only where the separation would leave the
county sector nearly all one race, the municipality was newly created
by special enactment, and its creation was definitely racially motivated,
would the Wright dissenters find the situation constitutionally intolerable.,
The previous decisions of the Court also provide broad clues as
to the outcome of other specific issues. The equitable remedy of metropolitan consolidation was not rejected in toto in Detroit. Support for
such a remedy was recognized. Judicial remedial power in cases involving racial discrimination has been guided by the traditional principles of equity. 9 3 While these attributes include practicality and flexibility, the traditional equity cases considering the remedies provide littie guidance in perceiving the limits on such power short of the impractical. 194
The authority relied upon in Detroit and by Judge Merhige and
Judge Winter in Richmond is relatively straightforward. These judges
saw the voting rights cases, notably Gomillion v. Lightfoot'9 5 and Reynolds v. Sims,'9 6 as authority for the proposition that a state may not
offer its political subdivisions as an impediment to the rectification of
a constitutional violation. In Gomillion, the Supreme Court invalidated
the actions of the Alabama legislature in gerrymandering the boundaries of Tuskegee from a square to a 28-sided configuration excluding
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

The variance in Detroit is city, 37:63, to tri-county, 75:25. 484 F.2d at 270.
Wright, 407 U.S. at 471 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 473.
Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
Cf. POMEROY'S EQtuTr JuRiSPRuiENCE § 109 (5th ed. 1941).
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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all but four or five of the 400 black voters.19 7 Reynolds ordered both
houses of the Alabama legislature apportioned on a population basis.' 98
While recognizing the power of the states over their political subdivisions, the Supreme Court held in both cases that this state power may
not be used to circumvent the equal protection clause.' 9 9 The recent
cases of Wright and Scotland Neck are seen by the judges 0 0 and the
commentators2 01 as an application of the theory of the voting rights
cases to desegregation remedies. The Detroit court did not alter this
rationale.2 0 2
The federalism limitation which was applied by the Detroit majority to require an active segregative effect or participation by the outlying districts was also perceivable in the case's antecedents. Though
"it 'is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise
their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy,' "203
the federal court may grant equitable relief if it "is convinced that the
asserted federal right cannot be preserved except by granting the 'extraordinary relief. .. . ,,204 Notwithstanding the decline of federalism
and the ascent of the powers of the federal government during the
twentieth century,20 5 the federal courts have been mindful of legitimate
state interests in devising remedies for constitutional violations. In response to attempts to subvert its rulings in Brown I and II, the Court
had occasion to reassert "the historic doctrine that the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the federal Constitution .
. 206 The
federal courts are the final arbiters of these questions but will consider
ways to protect both the state interest and the constitutional right.
197. 364 U.S. at 341.
198. 377 U.S. at 586-87.
199. Id. at 568. See 364 U.S. at 344-45 (Fifteenth Amendment).
200. Judge Merhige and the Fourth Circuit did not have the benefit of Wright and
Scotland Neck when they rendered their decisions. The Sixth Circuit found this analogy
persuasive. 484 F.2d at 250.
201. White Noose, supra note 4, at 351; Inevitable Sequel, supra note 56, at 169091.
202. Detroit, 484 F.2d at 250.
203. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943).
204. Alabama Pub. Serv. Conm'n v. Southern Rwy. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50
(1951).
205. W. BENNETr, AMEmCAN TnEoRms OF FEDERALISM 199-220 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BENNEr. "The [Tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained

which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
206. BENNETr, supra note 205, at 209. The two major cases wxere Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958) and Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La.
1960), aff'd, 366 U.S, 212 (1961),
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Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens2 °7 applied this principle
to the voting rights cases. There the district court had ordered redistricting of the Minnesota Legislature and reduced the size of the body
by 50 percent. The state interest in the size of the legislature imposed
a limit on the court's power to fashion a remedy, since size itself did
not effect a constitutional violation. The Court would not permit "such
'20 8
radical surgery in reapportionment.
Justice Powell, a key figure in Detroit, had recently gone on
record in favor of strong consideration for federalism limits on the
equity power. In his separate opinion in Keyes he discussed at length
his views on the scope of a permissible desegregation remedy. The
limit of the desegregation area for Justice Powell is definitely smaller
than the maximum distance a child can be bused each day.20 9
A constitutional requirement of extensive student transportation
solely to achieve integration presents a vastly more complex problem. ,It
promises on the one hand a greater degree of actual desegregation, while it infringes on what may fairly be regarded as other
important community aspirations and personal rights. Such a requirement is also likely to divert attention and resources from the
of any school system: the best quality education for
foremost goal
210
all pupils.
Indeed, Justice Powell noted that the degree of busing required to substantially integrate large urban areas "would have the gravest economic
and educational consequences." 2'11 He saw in Swann's refusal to require racial balance throughout the district a recognition that state, local
and personal interests are to be considered in fashioning a remedy.
As the author of the Court's opinion in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,2 2 Justice Powell would have recognized
that a consolidation in Detroit would tend to do by indirection what the
Court refused to do in Texas-impose statewide financing of schools.
The Sixth Circuit was aware of the problem but felt other decisions of
the Court requiring the state to make funds available to finance a constitutional remedy were controlling.2 13 Affirming the Detroit order
207. 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
208. Id. at 198. Justice Stewart dissented, citing Swann as authority for a broad,
flexible federal equity power. Id. at 202.
209. "To the extent that Swann may be thought to require large-scale or longdistance transportation of students in our metropolitan school districts, I record my profound misgivings." 413 U.S. 189, 238.
210. Id. at 242.
211. Id. at 242 n.21.
212. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
213. 484 F.2d at 258, citing, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218

(1964).
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would substantially limit the power of the affected localities to fund
their schools as they see fit. The San Antonio language is instructive:
Itmust be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the
Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state power under our federal system.
The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level
where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of
its supporters. . . . Each locality is free to tailor local programs
to local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation and a healthy competition for educational
excellence. An analogy to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate.2 14
Justice Powell also found support in the language of both Justice
Stewart and Chief Justice Burger in Wright concerning the importance
21 5
of the local control element in education.
This federalism restraint was reflected in the strict showing the
Detroit Court required. The four justices voting for affirmance in
Richmond had already expressed their position tacitly. The type of violation required had been a key problem for the Richmond appellate
court. That court accepted findings on state action in housing segregation but failed to find "that there was ever joint interaction between
any of two of the units involved (or by higher state officers) for the
purpose of keeping one unit relatively white by confining blacks to another." 216 The state's participation in school construction site selection
in the Richmond area lacked constitutional significance.
This very same sort of finding was the basis for the state action
finding in Detroit and the district judge's conclusion that a metropolitan
remedy was within the equity power of the court. The state legislature
had the power in Michigan to effect the remedy.2 17 No proof was
needed of segregative action by the suburban districts.
Through an application of its reasoning in Keyes to the Michigan
state action found in Detroit, the Court could have accepted the notion
214. 411 U.S. at 44, 49-50.
215. Id. at 49. The language of the Chief Justice in Wright highlights his Detroit
opinion. "Local control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but
it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well.
"The discretion of a district court is further limited where . . . it deals with totally
separate political entities." 407 U.S. at 478.
216. Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058, 1065 (4th Cir. 1972).
217. The Detroit court tried to distinguish Michigan's power over its schools from
Virginia's. 484 F.2d at 250-51. If Virgina's system is operated to achieve an unconstituitonal result, it should be no less sacrosanct.
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that the suburban districts need not'have created or perpetuated a condition of segregation. In Keyes, the Court held that plaintiffs need not
prove segregatory policies toward each school in the district to establish
a presumption that such policies were applied to all other schools.2 1
In Detroit the state has pursued a course of segregation in a meaningful portion of the metropolitan Detroit area. "Where school authorities
have been found to have practiced purposeful segregation in part of
a school system, they may be expected to oppose system-wide desegregation ..
."219 With Richmond as background and Justice Powell's
well articulated feelings on federalism, however, the Court's failure to
take this step is not surprising.
The Dissenters
Three of the four dissenters, Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, felt compelled to express their views in written opinions. All three
perceived the Court's narrow view of the state action required to justify
an inter-district remedy as a retreat from the previously adjudicated desegregation principles. All were distressed at what they saw to be a
constitutional violation for which the only effective remedy had been
foreclosed.
Justice Douglas finds in the majority opinion "a step that will likely
put the problems of the Blacks and our society back to the period that
'220
antedated the 'separate but equal' regime of Plessy v. Ferguson.
Given the state's extensive control over schools in Michigan, he could
find little -trouble with the metropolitan remedy on the record before
the Court. Metropolitan remedies were in wide use as solutions to
other problems, such as sewage or water treatment. 22 1 Justice Douglas
pointed out what he felt to be the fatal oversight in the majority thinking. School site selection, state-enforced racially restrictive covenants,
public housing and more were all state action within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the state action leading to segregated schools was found to exist, then any remedy which could be effected by the state was a permissible one. 222 The simple location and
construction of schools within a single district necessarily has an effect
218. 413 U.S. 189, 203.
219. Id. One commentator has argued that the state is the defendant in fact in all
school segregation cases and that the state-action concept should be expanded to frankly
admit this. Once done, a consolidation remedy presents little problem.. Inevitable Sequel, supra note 56.
220. 94 S. Ct. at 3134 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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on the housing pattern in that district with a concomitant effect on the
housing patterns in surrounding districts and the racial make-up of their
schools. Justice Douglas recognized that "it is conceivable that ghettos
develop on their own without any hint of state action," but he concluded
2 3
that that clearly was not the situation in Detroit.Justice White was acutely distressed over what he viewed as a blatant constitutional violation going without an effective remedy.
The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation
and their consequences will go unremedied, not -because a remedy
would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria
governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court
considers to be undue administra22 4
tive inconvenience to the State.
Justice White was mindful that segregation remedies were not
without limit. But the limits he saw were those imposed by the educational requirements of the youngsters whose schools were to be desegregated. When efforts to bus children and otherwise desegregate
schools infringe too greatly on the education of the children, then the
limit on the equitable remedies for school segregation would be
reached.2 25 Manifestly, he argued, this limit would not be reached
through an approval of a Detroit metropolitan remedy. He searched
the record and found convincing the conclusions of the trial court and
the court of appeals that even the best proposed Detroit-only plan
would still leave many schools in Detroit 75-90 percent black.22 6
As did his other dissenting brethren, Justice White saw the segregative acts found to have been committed by the state of Michigan
within the Detroit school district as state action which amply justified
the imposition of the metropolitan remedy.
The Court draws the remedial line at the Detroit School District
boundary, even though the Fourteenth Amendment is addressed to
the State and even though the State denies equal protection of the
laws when its public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate. The State's default is "the condition that offends the
constitution." . . . [T]here is no acceptable reason for permitting the party responsible for the constitutional violation to contain
the remedial powers of the federal court within administrative
2 r
boundaries over which the transgressor itself has plenary power. 2
Justice White made his independent examination of the school
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 3136.
Id. at 3136 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3136-37.
Id. at 3137.
Id. at 3140-41.
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desegregation cases leading to Detroit. He examined the voting rights
cases which mandated that state drawn political boundaries must give
way in the face of the equal protection clause. Along with the district
judge and the court of appeals, he found this authority supportive for
the remedy approved below.2 28
Justice White was unprepared to take the state interest in maintaining local control over its schools and raise it as a barrier to a truly
effective constitutional remedy. Indeed, he was unable to fathom how
the metropolitan remedy would destroy the local control deemed desirable by the majority. He noted that in Swann inter-district revisions
of attendance zones, pairing and grouping of schools were approved
for a geographic area similar to that of Detroit while the court remained
sensitive to the interests of parents in the education of their children.22 9
Finally, Justice White took issue with -the conclusion of the majority that a Detroit-only remedy could restore the victims of segregation
in Detroit to the situation they would have enjoyed absent such discrimination. 23 0 In order that the effects of past official segregation be eliminated "root and branch" a remedy was necessary that could achieve the
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the
practicalities of the situation. For Justice White, the majority approach
failed sadly to achieve this result.
Justice Marshall was -themost outspoken and bitter in his dissent.
For him, the Court's opinion was a giant step backward after twenty
years of small, difficult steps toward the goal of making a living truth
of our constitutional ideal of equal justice under the law.
The rights at issue in this case are too fundamental to be abridged
on grounds as superficial as those relied on by the majority today.
We deal here with the right of all of our children, whatever their
race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach
their full potential as citizens. Those children who have been denied that right in the past deserve better than to see fences thrown
up to deny them that right in the future. Our Nation, I fear, will
be ill-served by the Court's refusal to remedy separate and unequal
education, for unless our children begin to learn together,
23 1 there is
little hope that our people will ever learn to live together.
Justice Marshall concluded, as did his other dissenting brethren,
that the state of Michigan was ultimately responsible for curing the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools, and that a Detroit228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 3143.
Id. at 3144.
Id.
Id. at 3146 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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only remedy would not accomplish this task. 23 2 He castigates the majority for what he feels to be an unjust accusation that the district court
and the court of appeals were only trying to achieve a particular degree
of racial balance.2 33 Such criticism, he contends, flies in the face of
the repeated pronouncements of these lower courts that the result
sought was desegregation of the Detroit schools, a desegregation that
could be achieved only in the event the surrounding districts were in2 34
corporated into the plan.
The remedy envisioned by the majority was in effect no remedy
at all. When coupled with the very real phenomenon of "white flight!'
from the city schools which would be forthcoming from any Detroitonly decree, the majority's limitation on a remedy would have the effect
of turning the Detroit city schools into an all-black school system.
We cautioned in Swann, of course, that the dismantling of a segregated school system does not mandate any particular racial balance. . . . We also concluded that a remedy under which there
would remain a small number of racially identifiable schools was
only presumptively inadequate and might be justified. . . . But
this is a totally different case. The flaw of a Detroit-only decree
is not that it does not reach some ideal degree of racial balance
or mixing. It simply does not promise to achieve actual desegregation at all.235
The administrative problems alluded to by the majority, were niot
of sufficient magnitude to thwart the clear constitutional mandate perceived by Justice Marshall. 2 6 The district court would be empowered
to act only in the event of a default by the state authorities. Nowhere
in the record could Justice Marshall find any indication that the district
judge had acted or tended to act in any manner other than as a reviewing authority for constitutional violations. Justice Marshall would not
countenance any limitation on a metropolitan remedy when the record
before him showed the metropolitan remedy to be less administratively
burdensome in terms of number of students bused, number of buses,
and time of busing than the Detroit-only plan.23 7 Justice Marshall concluded with a warning for the future.
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public
mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's
guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles
232. Id. at 3149.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 3148.
Id.
Id. at 3156.
Id. at 3158.

237. Id. at 3160.
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of law. In the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to
allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two
cities--one white, the other black-but
it is a course, I predict, our
people will ultimately regret. 23a
Conclusion
With his concluding remarks, Justice Marshall has focused on what
truly appears to be the long-range effect of the Court's opinion. Absent a near-impossible showing that various school districts have conspired to keep black children isolated in one of them or that the state
has so operated, the state interest in local control over education will
impose an outer limit on a federal court's power to order desegregation.
The outer limit will be the political boundary of the individual school
system. Within those boundaries, a school system should look much
like that of Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina. 289 The nation and
the courts are weary of twenty years of school segregation litigation.
Prior to its decision in Detroit, the Court had begun to indicate that
it will decline to interfere in local school plans for desegregation that
are in general accord with the strictures of Swann.2 40 For the majority
at least, Detroit should be the end of the line in the school desegregation cases.
To ,the extent this approach of the Court fails to provide for maximum integration of schools subject only to legitimate practical limits,
it is reprehensible. The position adopted by the majority will be
viewed by those dissatisfied with busing and court-imposed integration
as a weakening of the Court's resolve to give meaning to the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws in the field of
education, thereby increasing resistance where integration plans are
2 -41
underway.
238. Id. at 3161.
239. See id. at 3160-61.
240. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973);
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
241. See, e.g., the extreme resistance to court ordered busing in Boston and the unfortunate speech by President Ford questioning the wisdom of busing. From the Schools
to the Streets, TWME, Oct. 21, 1974, at 24-25. Renewed congressional attempts to limit
busing and integration are also likely. Congress has in fact attempted to restrict the
power of the courts to order busing as a remedy in the Broomfield Amendment. The
amendment has not been judicially construed and has been largely ignored. Former
Justice Goldberg argues that both non-jurisdictional and jurisdictional attempts to limit
equity remedies now available to the courts would be unconstitutional because if a remedial limitation perpetuates segregation it would violate Fifth Amendment due process,
violate the separation of powers and would be neither "necessary and proper" (U.S.
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The majority position, when examined superficially, appears to be
based on sound constitutional principles. As the sharp dissents point
out, however, the majority's logic will not withstand close scrutiny, a
scrutiny required when the result reached by the majority leaves a
patent constitutional violation essentially remediless. Had the metropolitan area envisaged by the district court's consolidation remedy comprised one single school district, the Court would not likely have had
difficulty in approving a plan similar to the one suggested below. In
this context the Court seems to have raised to constitutional importance
the state-drawn political subdivisions that make up its school districts,
even though the Court has consistently recognized that these political
subdivisions are not sacrosanct when they conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Throughout the country the idiosyncrasies of school district boundary lines will determine the "equality" reached in the schools
in each area. The majority refuses to attach any constitutional significance to the increasing pattern of black urban ghettos surrounded by
white suburbs, even when there has been a showing of state-imposed
segregation within those urban ghettos. The majority assumes here a
lack of relationship between school segregation and demographic
change even though the dissent has pointed out the fallacy of this reasoning.
Perhaps the Court, as it did when it considered Brown I, should
again consider the sociological evidence to aid in its definition of
"meaningful integration." The judges at the court of appeals level who
opposed consolidation as the only feasible remedy in Richmond and
Detroit intimated a possible change in the view of educators concerning
242
the adverse psychological effects of racially identifiable schools.
Certainly the near-unanimity that faced the Brown I Court is no longer
present.2 43 Some sociologists oppose busing 244 while others persistCONST. art. 1, § 8) nor within Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Goldberg, The Administration's Anti-Busing Proposals-PoliticsMakes Bad Law, 67

Nw. U.L. Rxv. 319 (1972).

Justice Goldberg would approve the remedy in Richmond

and Detroit. Id. at 345.
242. Judge Craven of the Fourth Circuit notes the testimony of an expert that questions the busing of children out of the black cities as "paternalistic and patronizing" and

as limiting their interest in the local control over their schools.
[Richmond] 462 F.2d 1058, 1063.

Bradley v. School Bd.

This position is that of the Congress of Racial

Equality (CORE). Id.
Judge Weick, dissenting in the Sixth Circuit Detroit decision, criticizes the District
Judge for failing to admit the deposition of Harvard sociologist, David Armour, an opponent of large-scale busing. 484 F.2d 215, 269.
243. Clark, supra note 22, at xxxvi.
244. Noel A. Day, an urban sociologist, suggests that integration to full practical
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ently argue for continued efforts toward truly integrated schools while
45
expanding the drive for higher quality schools in depressed areas. 2
The Supreme Court appears to be following a pattern already familiar to constitutional scholars who have analyzed its opinions. The
Burger Court has retreated substantially from many positions advanced
by its predecessor Warren Court, not by directly overruling prior decisions, but by adjusting one way or the other the factual situations that
are required to make operative these earlier articulated principles. 24 6
In Detroit, the Court has not turned its back -totally on the principle
of full integration subject only to legitimate practical limitations, but it
has imposed a barrier that will prove difficult for those who attempt
to hurdle it. Had the majority sustained the lower court in Detroit, it
would have proven a bold step in eliminating school segregation in both
the North and South. Yet the majority is reticent to impose a consitutional requirement with such sweeping impact. Sweeping changes are
required if integrated schools and quality education are ever to become
a reality for the United States. Integration .to full practical limits would
not mean the abrogation of local control. The legislative branches of
our government have defaulted in their duty to effect the necessary
changes. The Brown I court was not afraid to issue its mandate for
sweeping change. The Detroit majority to a man would denounce any
notion that the Brown I principles had been diluted, yet they appear
2 47
unwilling to take the last step in fully developing those principles.
limits involving busing may defeat the real local control, by blacks, of schools that is
needed to provide equal educational opportunity. Day, The Case for All-Black Schools
in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTUNrIY 205 (HARv. EDuc. REv. ed. 1969).
Charles V. Hamilton, a professor at Roosevelt University, admits his plans facially
correspond to those of white segregationists, but argues for ghetto community schools
as "a central meeting place to discuss and organize around community issues, political
and economic." Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy in EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTuNrrY 187, 201 (HAv. EDUC. R-v. ed. 1969).
245. M. WENBERa, DESEGREGATION REsEARCH: AN APPRAIsAL 378-85 (1970); Cohen, Compensation and Integration in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNrIY 91 (HARv.
EDUC. REV. ed. 1969); Gallagher, Integrated Schools in the Black Cities?, 42 21.NEGRO
EDuc. 336 (1973). Clark, supra note 22. Clark also notes that, notwithstanding the
social policy benefits, schools in which more whites attend are better schools. 'Itis
not the white child per se whose presence leads to higher achievement for the Negro
child who associates with him inclass, but the quality of education provided because
the white child is there that makes the difference .... " Id. at xliv.
246. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
247. Broad equity power should direct the authority whose policies have contributed to segregation in the schools to take affirmative action to remedy the effects
and encourage integrated neighborhoods. Hart v. Community School Bd., 42 U.S.L.W.
2428 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1974).

